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(Fodor	y	los	demostrativos	en	el	lenguaje	del	pensamiento)	
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Abstract:		
In	this	paper,	we	consider	a	range	of	puzzles	for	demonstratives	in	the	language	of	thought	we	had	
raised	in	our	last	philosophical	conversation	we	had	with	Jerry	Fodor.	We	argue	against	the	Kaplan-
inspired	 indexing	 solution	 Fodor	 proposed	 to	 us,	 but	 offer	 a	 Fodor-friendly	 account	 of	 the	
demonstratives	in	the	language	of	thought	in	its	stead,	building	on	our	account	of	demonstrative	
pronouns	in	English.	
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Resumen:		
En	este	artículo	consideramos	una	variedad	de	acertijos	sobre	los	demostrativos	en	el	lenguaje	del	
pensamiento	que	le	planteamos	a	Jerry	Fodor	en	la	última	conversación	filosófica	que	mantuvimos	
con	él.	Criticamos	la	solución	kaplaniana	en	términos	de	índices	que	nos	propuso	Fodor,	y	en	su	
lugar	 ofrecemos	 una	 explicación	 de	 los	 demostrativos	 en	 el	 lenguaje	 del	 pensamiento	 que	 es	
amigable	con	Fodor,	la	cual	se	basa	en	nuestra	explicación	de	los	pronombres	demostrativos	en	el	
inglés.	
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Short	summary:		
This	paper	 considers	a	 range	of	puzzles	 for	demonstratives	 in	 the	 language	of	 thought	we	had	
raised	in	our	last	philosophical	conversation	we	had	with	Jerry	Fodor.	We	argue	against	the	Kaplan-
inspired	 indexing	 solution	 Fodor	 proposed	 to	 us,	 but	 offer	 a	 Fodor-friendly	 account	 of	 the	
demonstratives	in	the	language	of	thought	in	its	stead.	
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Introduction	
The	last	philosophical	conversation	we	had	with	Jerry	Fodor	was	on	the	topic	of	demonstratives	in	
the	 language	of	 thought	 (LOT).1	We	had	 raised	 for	 him	 the	 specter	of	 Frege-style	puzzles	with	
demonstratives	as	stymying	his	account	of	mental	content,	but	he	convinced	himself	that	a	liberal	
use	of	indexing	would	solve	these	puzzles.	Prima	facie,	his	suggestion	seems	wrong	in	all	the	same	
ways	an	analogous	position	about	demonstratives	in	natural	language	was	wrong	(as	articulated	
in	Kaplan	(1989b),	and	discussed	in	his	(1989a)).	In	what	follows,	we	will	review	Kaplan’s	efforts	to	
solve	Frege	puzzles	 for	natural	 language	demonstratives,	 and	Fodor’s	 strategy	 to	 try	 to	extend	
these	efforts	to	LOT.	Along	the	way,	we	will	articulate	problems	with	both.	And	lastly,	we’ll	sketch	
a	 positive	 proposal	 (extending	 our	 account	 of	 the	 semantics	 of	 demonstratives	 in	 English,	
developed	in	Stojnić	et	al	(2013,	2017))	and	then	show	how	it	can	be	exploited	to	solve	the	Frege-
style	puzzles	we	presented	Fodor	for	mental	content.		We	want	to	note	at	the	outset	that	there	is	
a	 significant	 literature	 on	 the	 topic	 and	 a	 number	 of	 authors	 have	weighed	 in	with	 their	 own	
criticisms	and	their	own	solutions	of	Frege	puzzles	for	demonstratives	in	natural	language	and	LOT,	
but	we	have	neither	the	space	nor	is	this	memorial	volume	the	proper	venue	for	such	explorations	
or	disputes.	So,	we	state	up	front	that	our	goals	are	modest;	namely,	to	focus	on	Fodor’s	suggestion	
made	to	us	in	passing	and	to	offer	in	its	place	a	solution	we	deem	Fodor	friendly.	We	begin	with	
the	problem.	
	
The	Problem	
Imagine	we	are	in	a	port,	where	a	large	ship,	Enterprise,	partially	occluded	by	a	block	of	buildings,	
is	passing	by.	One	interlocutor,	ignorant	of	the	situation,	points	to	the	bow	on	one	side	of	the	block,	
and	then	to	the	stern,	on	the	other,	while	saying:	
	
1. I	 doubt	 that	 (pointing	 to	 the	 bow	of	 the	 Enterprise)	 is	 identical	 to	 that	 (pointing	 to	 its	
stern).2		
	
According	 to	 the	 standard	 semantic	 account	 of	 the	 demonstrative	 “that”	 (Kaplan	 1989b),	 the	
content	of	its	occurrence	is	identical	to	the	object	demonstrated	by	the	speaker.3	Accordingly,	the	
first	 occurrence	 of	 a	 demonstrative	 in	 (1)	 picks	 out	 whatever	 is	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 first	
demonstrative	act	concomitant	with	its	use,	and	the	second	by	whatever	is	demonstrated	by	the	
second	 act	 concomitant	 with	 its	 use.	 Since	 the	 speaker	 fails	 to	 notice	 there	 is	 only	 one	 ship,	
Enterprise,	 the	 embedded,	 complement	 clause	 in	 (1)	 simply	 expresses	 a	 proposition	 of	 self-
identity.	But	no	one	could	doubt	the	ship	is	self-identical!	This	is	just	a	variation	on	Frege	puzzles	
extended	to	demonstratives.4		
                                                
1	See	Fodor	(1975,	2008)	for	the	discussion	of	the	LOT	hypothesis.		
2	This	example	is	famously	due	to	Perry	(1977).	
3	Whether	it	is	a	demonstration,	or	another	parameter,	e.g.,	the	speaker’s	referential	intention,	which	fixes	the	
content	of	a	demonstrative,	does	not	matter	for	present	purposes.	See,	e.g.,	Kaplan’s	(1989b)	for	an	account	that	
places	the	meaning	fixing	role	on	speaker	intentions,	rather	than	demonstrations.	
4	See	Frege	(1892/1980)	for	the	original	version	of	the	puzzle.		
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The	Fregean	solution	of	attributing	distinct	senses	to	co-referring	expressions,	however,	cannot	
get	off	the	ground	here,	since,	as	seems	reasonable,	the	demonstrative	“that”	has	a	unique	sense,	
and	so,	its	two	occurrences	in	(1)	share	the	same	sense	and	reference.	Thus,	from	the	standpoint	
of	Frege,	they	are	synonymous.	But	(1)	is	obviously	making	a	claim	which	can	be	quite	informative.5		
	
Kaplan	 acknowledged	 the	 problem	 and	 offered	 a	 non-Fregean	 solution	 to	 the	 demonstrative	
version	of	the	Frege’s	puzzle	by	appealing	to	separate	aspects	of	meaning:	character	and	content.	
The	character	of	an	expression	specifies	its	linguistic,	standing	meaning,	say,	for	the	demonstrative	
“that”	 that	 its	 referent,	 for	 any	 use,	 is	 the	 inanimate	 object	 the	 speaker	 is	 demonstrating. 6		
Formally,	 it	 is	 specified	 as	 a	 function	 from	 contexts—comprising	 parameters	 of	 the	 utterance	
situation	on	which	the	interpretation	depends,	e.g.,	the	world	of	utterance,	the	speaker,	the	time	
of	utterance,	the	location	of	utterance7—to	contents—the	semantic	content	of	an	expression	on	
an	occasion	of	 use.	 Contents,	 so	 construed,	 can	be	 seen	 as	 a	 function	 from	a	 circumstance	of	
evaluation	 (comprising	 at	 least	 a	 world,	 and	 possibly	 a	 time,	 location	 and	 other	 parameters	
(Kaplan,	1989b))	to	extensions.8		
	
The	 character	 of	 certain	 expressions	 is	 a	 constant	 function,	 marking	 them	 as	 not	 varying	 in	
interpretation	with	changes	in	a	circumstances	of	use.	A	name	like	“David	Kaplan”	picks	out	David	
Kaplan	 on	 every	 occasion	 of	 use,	 regardless	 of	 context.	 	 However,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 some	
expressions,	like	the	first	person	pronoun	“I”,	varies	with	context	of	use,	and	so,	their	character	is	
not	 constant:	 it’s	 a	 function	 from	 context	 to	 possibly	 different	 entities:	 if	 you	 say	 (2),	 the	
proposition	 you	 express	 will	 be	 that	 you	 are	 hungry,	 but	 if	 another	 says	 it,	 the	 proposition	
expressed	will	be	that	this	other	speaker	is	hungry:	
	
2. I	am	hungry.	
	
Similar	 considerations	 apply	 to	 “that”,	 though	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 difference:	 “that”	 is	 a	 true	
demonstrative,	 and	 “I”	a	pure	 indexical,	 in	 the	 jargon	of	Kaplan.9	This	means	 that	 the	 standing	
meaning	of	“I”,	but	not	of	“that”,	fully	determines	a	referent	on	an	occasion	of	use:	“I”	simply	picks	
out	whoever	utters	 it.	 	 “That”’s	standing	meaning	requires	extra-linguistic	supplementation:	an	
intention	or	a	demonstration.	
                                                
5	Obviously,	 such	a	 Fregean	account	would	 struggle	 to	explain	 the	apparent	direct	 referentiality	of	 demonstrative	
thought.	This	primary	point	of	disagreement	separated	Kaplan	from	Frege.		
6	This	can	be	complicated	in	all	sorts	of	ways	to	capture	that	demonstratives	track	distal/proximal	distinctions	(“this”	
vs	“that”),	or	that	they	can	be	sensitive	to	intentions	rather	than	demonstrations,	etc.	But	these	complications	are	
orthogonal	to	our	main	point,	and	so	we	will	ignore	them.	
7	It	makes	no	difference	to	our	main	points	whether	all	of	these	parameters	are	indeed	contextual	(as	Kaplan	1989b),	
or	whether	 context	 includes	 further	 contextual	parameters	 that	might	be	needed	 (e.g.,	 standards	of	precision	 for	
gradable	adjectives,	etc.).	As	Kaplan	puts	it,	a	“context	is	a	package	of	whatever	parameters	are	needed	to	determine	
the	referent,	and	thus	the	content,	of	the	directly	referential	expressions	of	the	language”	(Kaplan	1989b).	
8	Things	are	more	complicated	if	contents	are	structured,	but	this	also	is	orthogonal	to	our	main	issue.	
9	See	Kaplan	(1989a,b)	for	a	defense	of	this	distinction,	though	see	Stojnić	(2016,	2017,	2019a,2019b),	Stojnić	et	al	
(2017)	for	a	criticism	of	it.		
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A	distinction	between	the	character	and	content	of	demonstrative	expressions	is	relevant	to	Frege	
puzzle	 in	 that,	 given	 this	 distinction,	 the	 latter	 is	 essentially	 exhausted	 by	 reference,	 while	
“cognitive	 significance”	 is	 relegated	 to	 the	 former. 10 	So,	 unlike	 Frege,	 who	 builds	 cognitive	
significance	 into	 content,	 Kaplan	 relegates	 it	 to	 character.	 To	 illustrate	 how	 the	 strategy	 is	
supposed	to	help,	consider	a	case	from	Perry	(1979).11		Suppose	someone	has	been	tracking	a	trail	
of	sugar	left	behind	by	a	shopper	in	a	supermarket.	Upon	seeing	herself	in	the	mirror,	not	realizing	
it	is	she,	she	says,	‘She	is	the	messy	shopper’.	But	when	she	comes	to	realize	it	is	she	who	is	making	
the	mess,	she	says,	‘I	am	the	messy	shopper’.	Even	though	the	occurrences	of	‘she’	and	‘I’	have	the	
same	referent,	and	thus,	the	same	content,	the	two	utterances	differ	in	cognitive	significance,	on	
this	proposal,	because	of	the	difference	in	characters	of	‘I’	and	‘she’—the	standing	meaning	of	the	
expressions—respectively.		But	how	is	the	proposal	supposed	to	extend	to	(1)?	
Supposedly,	the	English	word	‘that’	has	a	unique	character;	so,	if	character	is	supposed	to	be	the	
bearer	of	cognitive	significance,	how	then	can	we	explain	the	potential	informativeness	of	(1)?	It	
would	seem	Kaplan’s	proposal	doesn’t	provide	a	way	out	of	 the	puzzle	surrounding	cognitively	
significant	utterances	of	(1).		As	noted,	Frege,	and	those	following	his	tradition,	take	such	examples	
to	 establish	 a	 need	 for	 richer,	more	 fine-grained	 contents	 that	 consist	 of	 senses	 (or	modes	 of	
presentation).	Since	there	is	only	one	word	“that”	involved	in	this	puzzle,	this	strategy	would	either	
require	positing	a	single	word	with	distinct	senses,	or	more	likely,	positing	an	ambiguity	for	“that”.	
Others	 have	 taken	 such	 examples	 to	 indicate,	 instead,	 the	 need	 to	 individuate	 vehicles	 of	
demonstrative	speech	more	finely	(Lepore	and	Ludwig	2000).12	This	account,	too,	would	posit	a	
kind	of	an	ambiguity	for	“that”.	Kaplan	himself	exploits	what	is	essentially	a	version	of	the	later	
strategy,	maintaining	the	character	of	a	true	demonstrative	is	only	determined	once	coupled	with	
a	 demonstration;	 when	 coupled	 with	 different	 demonstrations,	 different	 characters,	 and	 so,	
cognitive	 significances	are	determined.13	One	way	 this	 can	be	 represented	 in	 logical	 form	 is	by	
associating	different	indices	with	distinct	occurrences	of	the	demonstrative	in	logical	form,	one	for	
each	demonstration,	and	so,	for	each	character.	Whether	a	use	of	(1)	is	informative	depends	on	
whether	the	sentence	used	is	(1a)	or	its	homonymous	(1b):	
1a.	I	doubt	that1	ship	(pointing	to	bow)	is	identical	to	that1	one	(pointing	to	stern).		
1b.	I	doubt	that1	ship	(pointing	to	bow)	is	identical	to	that2	one	(pointing	to	stern).		
                                                
10 	Functional	 presentation	 of	 Kaplan’s	 semantics	 somewhat	 complicates	 the	 idea	 that	 content	 is	 exhausted	 by	
reference,	but	in	ways	inessential	for	our	purposes.	We	stick	to	Kaplan’s	intended	description	of	his	system.	See	Kaplan	
(1989b)	for	discussion.		
11	Whether	 it	 helps	 is	 controversial,	 but	we	will	 not	 address	 this	 issue	here.	 (See,	 e.g.,	 Perry,	 (1977,	 1979);	 Evans	
(1981).)	
12	Most	formal	treatments	of	multiple	demonstratives	have	resorted	to	subscripting	the	demonstratives	in	a	formal	
representation.		See,	e.g.,	Burge	(1974);	Kaplan	(1989b);	Larson	and	Segal	(1995);	Lewis,	(1972).	
13	Kaplan’s	 (1989b)	 	strategy	posits	an	ambiguity	 in	character:	 the	character	of	“that"	 is	determined	only	once	 it	 is	
coupled	 with	 a	 demonstration:	 so,	 distinct	 demonstrations	 result	 in	 distinct	 characters.	 Insofar	 as	 the	 linguistic	
meaning	of	a	demonstrative	is	incomplete,	and	requires	extra-linguistic	supplementation	(a	demonstration),	one	might	
understand	this	as	underspecification,	rather	than	lexical	ambiguity.	However,	the	formal	account	is	committed	to	a	
kind	of	ambiguity	insofar	as	different	occurrences	of	demonstratives	receive	different	representations	in	the	logical	
form.	For	a	discussion	see	Kaplan	(1989a),	and	Braun	(1996).	
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In	 (1a)	 and	 (1b),	 both	 occurrences	 of	 a	 demonstrative	 pick	 out	 Enterprise,	 but	 (1b)	 can	 be	
informative,	whereas	(1a)	not,14	because	the	two	demonstrative	expressions	in	(1b)	can	differ	in	
character.		And	so,	(1b)	is	something	a	speaker	can	use	consistently	as	something	she	can	wonder	
and/or	disbelieve,	whereas	 (1a)	cannot	be	so	used.	This	 is	because,	 instead	of	having	separate	
occurrences	of	 the	English	demonstrative	“that”	uniformly	represented	 in	 (1),	according	to	this	
suggestion,	 we	 have	 occurrences	 of	 separate	 homonyms	 potentially	 with	 distinct	 characters,	
namely,	“that1”	and	“that2”.	
Before	evaluating	this	proposal,	we	turn	to	its	extension	by	Fodor	to	LOT.	
	
Demonstrative	thought	
Instead	 of	 demonstrative	 linguistic	 acts,	 Fodor’s	 interest	 lies	 with	 demonstrative	 thoughts.		
Paradigms	are	thoughts	typically	expressed	by	sentences	like	“That	is	lovely,”	where,	under	normal	
conditions,	the	intended	referent	of	‘that’	is	the	most	prominently	present	object;	as	we’ve	seen,	
its	different	occurrences	can	express	different	thoughts.		Now,	whereas	the	sentence	contains	the	
demonstrative	‘that’,	the	corresponding	demonstrative	thought,	presumably	contains	a	thought	
constituent,	 ‘THAT’,	which	when	mentally	tokened,	refers	to	some	particular.	 	What’s		distinctive	
about	 these	demonstratives	 is	 that	 they	arguably	 form	the	most	direct	 link	between	mind	and	
world.	The	connection	with	the	world	is	direct,	and	non-mediated	(i.e.,	demonstrative	concepts,	
like	demonstrative	expressions,	exhibit	direct	referentiality,	in	the	sense	of	Kaplan	(1989b)).	Thus,	
suppose	 someone	 is	 looking	 at	 distinct	 objects,	 a	 and	b,	 and	 thinks	 to	 herself	 the	Mentalese	
counterpart	of	(3).		
3. That	is	distinct	from	that.		
The	referent	of	the	first	occurrence	of	the	demonstrative	is	a,	and	the	second	is	b.	Regardless	of	
this	 immediacy,	 demonstrative	 thoughts	 of	 the	 form	 ‘THAT	 IS	 (IDENTICAL	 WITH)	 THAT’,	 where	 the	
occurrences	of	the	demonstrative	refer	to	one	object,	can	presumably	sometimes,	just	as	in	natural	
language,	be	informative,	and	not	a	mere	application	of	self-identity.	So,	suppose	the	subject	is	
looking	through	two	small	holes	on	an	opaque	screen,	each	attached	to	a	tube,	focusing	each	eye	
separately,	looking	at	a	single	red	dot	on	a	white	surface.	The	subject,	then,	is	having	an	experience	
of	qualitatively	identical	images,	each	of	a	red	dot	on	a	white	background.	Given	this	information,	
                                                
14	There	is	a	genuine	question	of	whether	an	utterance	of	“That	is	that"	can	ever	be	used	in	a	way	that	is	essentially	
uninformative.	Kaplan	points	out	the	demonstrative	“that”	seems	to	require	a	new	demonstration	with	each	
occurrence.	If	two	occurrences	of	a	demonstrative	are	governed	by	a	single	demonstration,	at	least	one	has	to	be	
anaphoric	(contrast	“That	is	that”	with	“That	is	itself”).	The	point	seems	to	be	that,	even	if	the	speaker	is	uttering	the	
demonstrative	while	performing	a	single	pointing	gesture	towards	an	object,	English	doesn’t	force	occurrences	of	a	
demonstratives	to	co-refer.	So,	if	they	do,	this	is	a	mere	accident.	This	would,	in	turn,	suggest	that	each	occurrence	
of	a	demonstrative	(setting	aside	anaphora)	requires	a	different	index,	corresponding	to	a	demonstration,	and	
hence,	a	different	character.	This	yields	what	Kaplan	calls	“exotic	ambiguity”	in	the	use	of	a	demonstrative	(Kaplan,	
1989b).	We	shall	return	to	ambiguity	below.	For	our	purposes,	though,	it	does	not	matter	whether	one	can	use	“That	
is	that”	uninformatively	(i.e.,	whether	one	can	express	a	form	like	(1a)	with	an	utterance	of	that	sentence).	What	
matters	is	that	one	can	use	it	informatively,	which	is	a	puzzle	in	itself.	Hence,	the	task	is	to	explain	how	we	can	use	it	
to	express	forms	like	(1b).		
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for	all	the	subject	knows,	she	could	be	looking	at	one	dot	or	two,	depending	on	the	angle	of	the	
tubes.15	This	subject	could	think	to	herself	the	Mentalese	counterpart	of	(4):		
4. I	wonder	whether	that	is	that.	
where	the	first	occurrence	of	the	demonstrative	picks	out	the	dot	seen	through	the	left	eye,	and	
the	second	seen	through	the	right	one.	Even	though	there	is	a	single	dot	the	subject	is	experiencing,	
she	is	not	wondering	whether	self-identity	applies.	(This	is	the	same	type	of	puzzle	we	saw	earlier.	
We	could	alter	the	Enterprise	case	to	be	about	mental	content	as	well.)			
Whatever	else	 the	moral	 is,	as	with	natural	 language,	our	 treatment	of	demonstrative	 thought	
must	be	more	complicated	than	simply	letting	the	object	causally	responsible	for	the	occurrence	
of	the	demonstrative	itself	be	a	constituent	of	the	thought.	One	possibility	might	be	to	try	to	invoke	
Kaplan’s	distinction	between	character	and	(semantic)	content	again,	letting	content	be	exhausted	
by	reference,	while		relegating	“cognitive	significance”	to	character.	This	strategy	would	seem	to	
help	with	certain	cases	of	indexical	thought.16	When	the	messy	shopper	comes	to	realize	it	is	she	
who	was	making	the	mess,	she	will	think	to	herself	the	conceptual	counter-part	of	‘I	am	the	messy	
shopper’.	And	even	though	the	mental	counterparts	of	‘she’	and	‘I’	have	the	same	referent,	and	
thus,	 the	 same	 content,	 the	 two	 thoughts	 differ	 in	 cognitive	 significance,	 due	 to	 the	 different	
characters	of	the	mental	counterparts	of	‘I’	and	‘she’	respectively.	But,	just	as	with	Kaplan,	in	our	
demonstrative	 cases	 this	 proposal	 is	 also	 not	 obviously	 helpful,	 for,	 supposedly,	 the	 mental	
counterpart	of	‘that’	should	have	a	unique	character;	thus,	if	character	is	the	bearer	of	cognitive	
significance,	we	cannot	explain	why	‘THAT	IS	THAT’	can	be	informative.		Perhaps,	this	explains	why	
Fodor	told	us	he	wanted	to	resort	to	indexing.		With	indexing,	we	cannot	assume	it	is	the	same	
vehicle	of	thought	flanking	the	identity;	for	distinct	indices,	m	and	n,	‘THATn’	and	‘THATm’	are	naturally	
understood	as	tokens	of	different	concepts	or	mental	symbols,	rather	than	that	of	a	single	concept.	
It	is	this	distinction	in	indexing—an	employment	of	a	different	vehicle,	or	a	symbol	with	a	different	
character—that	explains	the	difference	in	cognitive	significance.	And	so,	we	cannot	assume	that	
the	expressions	flanking	the	identity	have	the	same	character,	and	same	cognitive	significance.	
So,	 in	 the	 Two	 Tubes	 case	 and	 the	 Enterprise	 example,	 the	 thought	 ‘THAT1	 IS	 THAT2’	 can	 be	
informative,	since	even	though	both	occurrences	of	a	demonstrative	pick	out	the	red	dot	or	the	
Enterprise,	how	what	is	thought	differs	from	how	what	would	be	thought	by,	say,	the	thought	‘THAT1	
IS	THAT1’,	where	both	tokens	of	a	demonstrative	in	LOT	also	pick	out	the	Enterprise,	or	the	red	dot.
17	
Instead	of	two	separate	tokens	of	a	single	mental	symbol	in	(4),	namely,	the	demonstrative	‘THAT’,	
we	have	two	distinct	symbols	tokened,	namely,	‘THAT1’	and	‘THAT2’.
18	
                                                
15	The	example	is	a	variant	of	Austin’s	“Two	Tubes	Puzzle”	(1990),	which	is	a	variant	of	a	Frege	puzzle,	involving	
demonstratives.	
16	See	Perry	(1979),	in	particular.	
17	Again,	we	shall	not	worry	about	whether	such	thoughts	can	be	uninformative,	only	about	how	they	could	be	
informative.	As	explained	above,	this	in	itself	is	a	puzzle.		
18	As	before,	this	suggests	an	ambiguity:	‘THAT1’	and	‘THAT2’	are	naturally	understood	as	tokens	of	different	concepts	
or	mental	symbols,	rather	than	that	of	a	single	concept;	after	all,	recall,	it	is	the	distinction	in	indexing—an	employment	
of	a	different	vehicle,	or	a	symbol	with	a	different	character—that	explains	the	difference	in	cognitive	significance.	
One	could,	we	suppose,	as	with	linguistic	expressions,	subscribe	to	underspecification,	according	to	which	‘THAT1’	and	
 	
8	
	
Problems	with	indexing19	
One	worry	this	strategy	faces	for	language	and	thought,	already	foreshadowed	earlier	in	the	text,	
is	that	“that”	and	“THAT”	seem	like	an	unambiguous	word	and	a	single	concept	respectively,	and	not	
distinct	homonymous	words	and	concepts.	But	representing	different	tokens	of	a	demonstrative	
with	different	indices	treats	“that”	and	‘THAT’	as	ambiguous.	Start	with	the	demonstrative	“that”.	If	
its	 character	 is	 its	 standing	meaning,	 then	 if	 each	 indexed	 demonstrative	 is	 associated	with	 a	
different	character,	“that”	is	indefinitely	ambiguous—one	meaning	for	each	index.	Likewise,	we’d	
have	to	posit	indefinitely	many	concepts	‘THATn’,	one	for	each	index.	
This	strikes	us	as	implausible.	First,	English	seems	to	have	one	word,	“that”,	not	indefinitely	many	
accidental	homonyms.	It’s	hard	to	imagine	a	competent	speaker	who	understands	the	meaning	of	
one	 instance	of	“that”,	but	 fails	 to	understand	another.	 (By	contrast,	a	competent	speaker	can	
know	 one	meaning	 of	 “bank”,	 but	 not	 another.)	 Similar	 considerations	 ought	 to	 hold	 for	 the	
concept	‘THAT’.	
Furthermore,	 if	 “that”	 is	ambiguous	between	differently	 indexed	expressions,	what	determines	
the	distribution	of	indices	for	any	given	tokening?	To	see	what’s	at	stake,	consider	an	utterance	of	
(5):	
5. That	it	distinct	from	that.	
Is	 its	disambiguation	“That1	is	distinct	 from	that2”	or	“That1	is	distinct	 from	that1”?	The	answer	
cannot	simply	depend	on	whether	the	demonstratives	are	co-referential—this	would	rule	out	(1),	
where	the	speaker	is	wondering	whether	something	which,	in	fact,	is	a	single	ship,	is	a	single	ship.20	
Perhaps,	 we	 could	 say	 that,	 for	 any	 n,	 the	 character	 of	 the	 demonstrative	 ‘thatn’,	 or	 with	 a	
demonstrative	concept,	 ‘THATn’,	picks	out	 the	nth	object	demonstrated	on	an	occasion	of	use	or	
mental	tokening	respectively.		On	this	scenario,	 in	a	given	context,	a	use	of	‘thatn’	 is	acceptable	
only	 if	the	speaker	 intends	to	pick	out	the	nth	object	demonstrated	in	that	context	(if	any),	and	
similarly	 for	 her	 tokening	 of	 a	 demonstrative	 concept,	 ‘THATn’.	 This	 suggestion	 is	 not	 without	
problems:	for	one,	it	is	not	clear	that	one	can	have	repeated	occurrences	of	a	single	demonstrative,	
say	 ‘thatn’,	 in	 a	 single	 context.21 	Due	 to	 reasons	 mentioned	 earlier,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 a	 single	
demonstration,	 or	 demonstrative	 intention,	 can	 be	 associated	 with	 different	 tokenings	 of	 a	
demonstrative.	 (Recall,	 Kaplan	 (1989b)	 points	 out	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 English,	 when	 two	
demonstratives	 are	 linked	 to	 a	 single	 demonstration,	 or	 demonstrative	 intention,	 at	 least	 one	
seems	anaphoric,	as	exemplified	by	the	contrast	between	“That	[pointing	at	a	vase]	will	break,	if	
that	[pointing	at	a	vase]	falls”	with	“That	will	break	if	it	falls.”	It	is	not	unnatural	to	think	the	same	
                                                
‘THAT2’	 are	 tokens	 of	 the	 one	 and	 the	 same,	 albeit	 underspecified,	 concept	 ‘THAT’,	which	 has	 full	 character—or	
corresponds	 to	a	 complete	 vehicle—only	once	 coupled	with	an	 index.	Whether	or	not	 such	an	underspecification	
account	is	viable	at	the	level	of	concepts,	our	main	worries	will	apply	equally	to	such	an	account	as	well.		
19	As	mentioned	earlier,	Braun	(1996)	contains	an	interesting	discussion	of	difficulties	this	approach	raises	in	Kaplan’s	
framework	for	providing	a	semantics	for	(English)	demonstratives.	
20	Bear	in	mind	one	could	in	principle	(finiteness	limitations	aside)	have	sentences	with	indefinitely	many	occurrences	
of	a	demonstrative	expression.	(E.g.,	“That	is	that,	which	is	that,	which	is	that,…”.)	
21	See	Kaplan	(1989b)	for	a	discussion	of	this	worry.	See	also	Braun	(1996).	
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applies	to	the	corresponding	thoughts.)	If	so,	this	means	each	new	tokening	corresponds	to	a	new	
expression.22			
But	there	is	a	larger,	though	related,	problem	with	indexing;	it	seems	to	saddle	us	with	indefinitely	
many	words	and	concepts—as	many	as	there	are	n-s.23		This	in	itself	is	not	yet	a	problem,	since	it	
is	uncontroversial	 that	 there	are	 infinitely	many	words	 (and	concepts)	 a	 finite	mind	can	grasp,	
where	this	is	standardly	explained	on	the	assumption	of	compositionality	(Fodor	and	Lepore	2002).	
But	we	need	to	settle	that	these	purported	ambiguities	do	not	require	infinitely	many	primitive	
concepts. 24 	So,	 can	 we	 invoke	 compositionality	 to	 account	 for	 the	 meaning	 of	 each	 indexed	
expression?	Prima	facie,	it	might	seem	we	cannot,	since	the	semantic	value	of	“that1”	(or	“THAT1”)	
doesn’t	seem	to	be	a	function	of	the	values	of	“that”	(or	“THAT”)	and	“1”	(or	“1”),	in	any	natural	
sense	relevant	for	the	productivity	of	thought.25	We	can,	of	course,	specify	a	function	that	would	
obey	compositionality:	we	could	take	the	character	of	“that”	to	be	a	function	from	contexts	to	
functions	from	indices	to	objects.	Then,	given	a	context	C1,“thatn”	is	interpreted	as	a	function	that	
takes	the	index	n	and	delivers	the	nth	demonstrated	entity	in	C1,	if	any.26	This	essentially	means	
“that”	maps	a	given	context	to	an	assignment	function:	a	(partial)	mapping	of	indices	to	objects.	In	
this	case,	“thatn”	is	complex,	and	its	context-sensitivity	is	inherited	from	the	different	assignment	
functions	denoted	by	“that”	in	different	contexts	(we	can	assume	that	the	numeral	is	a	constant,	
delivering	n	for	“n”	in	any	context).	Alternatively,	we	could	treat	“thatn”,	not	compositionally,	but	
via	a	background	semantic	rule	that	specifies	the	meanings	of	all	primitives	at	once:	for	any	n	in		
and	context	c,	“thatn”	denotes	the	nth	object	demonstrated	in	c;	otherwise,	it	is	undefined.	This	
would	 essentially	 interpret	 demonstratives	 as	 variables,	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 Kaplan’s	 (1989a,	 b)	
proposal.	
Perhaps,	such	accounts	can	explain	how	to	generate	indefinitely	many	demonstrative	expressions	
in	a	compositional	fashion.	They	still,	however,	posit	rampant	ambiguity	where	there	is	seemingly	
none:	at	the	level	of	logical	form,	or	meaning	representation,	a	seemingly	unambiguous	expression	
is	represented	in	potentially	indefinitely	many	distinct	ways.	More	precisely,	on	the	first	account,	
the	one	 invoking	 semantic	 composition,	while	 the	demonstrative	 itself	makes	an	unambiguous	
                                                
22	Note,	 further,	 it	 is	 unclear	 how	 to	 individuate	 contexts	 relevant	 for	 thoughts.	 If	 a	 context	 spans	 only	 a	 single	
sentence,	inference	will	be	difficult	to	capture	(e.g.,	in	principle,	we	might	want	valid	instances	of	“That	is	round	and	
red.	Therefore,	that	is	red”).	But	if	a	context	can	span	an	arbitrary	number	of	sentences,	it	becomes	difficult	to	tell,	in	
a	non-arbitrary	way,	when	a	new	context	begins	and	a	previous	one	ends.	On	the	present	picture,	it	is	the	individuation	
of	contexts	that	crucially	factors	into	the	individuation	of	expressions	(e.g.,	whether	we	have	a	tokening	of	“THATn”,	
sensitive	to	the	nth		demonstration	of	an	old	context,	or	the	1st	demonstration	of	a	new	one).	It	is	even	less	clear	agents	
have	a	non-arbitrary	way	tracking	such	distinctions,	let	alone	play	the	role	of	cognitive	significance.	
23	Though,	see	Levine	(2010)	for	possible	constraints	on	the	number	of	indices.	
24	We	follow	Davidson	(2001/1966,		8–9)	in	saying	an	expression	is	a	semantic	primitive	relative	to	a	set	of	interpretable	
items	iff	its	meaning	is	unpredictable	from	the	meanings	of	members	of	the	set.	
25	Note	 that	 even	 on	 a	 Kaplanean	 story,	 the	 numerical	 index	 is	 supposed	 to	 contribute	 a	 mode	 of	 presentation	
associated	with	a	demonstration	(or	intention),	and	not	a	linguistically	specified	meaning	of	the	index.	
26	That	is,	we	interpret	“that”	roughly	as	λc.λn.f(n),	where	f(n)	=	cn	where	cn	is	the	nth	object	demonstrated	in	context	
c;	or	else,	f(n)	=	#,	where	#	is	the	undefined	value.		Presumably,	this	is	the	content	of	“that”	in	c,	which	combined	with	
a	numeral	n	delivers	the	content	of	“thatn”,	the	nth	object	demonstrated,	if	any,	or	else	#.	Notice	that	this	suggests	
“thatn”	doesn’t		have	an	interesting	character,	and	in	any	case,	not	a	context-sensitive	one	(it	has	different	contents	in	
different	contexts,	but	all	context-sensitivity	is	inherited	from	“that”).		
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contribution,	it	is	incomplete,	and	requires	composition	with	an	index;	but	one	and	the	same	string	
“That	is	lovely”	or	“THAT	IS	LOVELY”	can	feature	indefinitely	many	distinct	indices,	and	so,	the	form	
is	 still	 indefinitely	 ambiguous.27	On	 the	 second	account,	meanwhile,	 different	occurrences	of	 a	
demonstrative	 are	 represented	 by	 different	 subscripted	 expressions,	 again	 allowing	 for	 a	
seemingly	unambiguous	“That	is	lovely”	or	“THAT	IS	LOVELY”	to	be	indefinitely	ambiguous.		
Further,	both	accounts	fail	to	explain	why,	when	we	point	to	the	bow	and	stern,	wondering	“Is	that	
the	 same	 as	 that?”,	 the	 representation	 is	 “Is	 that1	 the	 same	 as	 that2?,”	 rather	 than	 any	 other	
potential	 disambiguation,	 and	 further,	 how	 this	 affects	 the	 cognitive	 significance	 so	 that	 such	
thoughts	are	not	merely	questioning	the	law	of	self-identity.	While	we	don’t	want	to	argue	these	
considerations	should	be	taken	as	decisive,	knock-down	arguments	against	any	kind	of	indexing	
strategy,	they	do	make	us	pessimistic	regarding	a	satisfactory	and	explanatory	implementation	of	
an	 indexing	 account.	 At	 any	 rate,	 without	 attempting	 to	 settle	 the	 debate	 over	 its	 ultimately	
viability	here	(in	particular,	without	further	exploring	the	question	regarding	the	possibility	of	a	
productive,	yet	unambiguous,	account	of	demonstrative	meaning),	we	instead	suggest	an	account	
that	avoids	ambiguity,	assigns	a	single,	uniform	meaning,	and	does	so	 in	a	way	we	think	Fodor	
would	have	found	to	be	a	friendly	emendation.		
	
Back	to	Demonstrative	Thought		
Our	suggestion,	in	short,	is	that	an	occurrence	of	a	demonstrative	‘THAT’	in	LOT	refers	to	whichever	
object	is	currently	at	the	center	of	attention	(in	a	sense	to	be	explained	presently).28,	29	So,	if	we	
observe	objects	a	and	b,	and	think	to	ourselves	(6):		
                                                
27	It	is	worth	reemphasizing	that	there	is	a	further	open	question	of	what	aspect	of	the	token	utterance	or	thought	
contributes	the	index,	and	how	that	determines	its	cognitive	significance,	in	a	way	that	distinguishes	the	cognitive	
significance	of	‘thatm’	and	‘thatn’	(‘THATm’	and	‘THATn’),	for	distinct	m,	n.	
28	Stojnić	et	al	(2017,	2013)	provides	an	analogous	account	of	demonstratives	in	English.	However,	the	notion	of	the	
center	of	attention	relevant	for	the	interpretation	of	a	demonstrative	in	English	defended	there	is	not	determined	by	
a	psychological	notion	of	attention,	but	a	linguistic	one,	where	what's	at	the	center	of	attention,	in	the	relevant	sense,	
in	a	discourse	is	determined	through	a	set	of	conventionalized	linguistic	rules.	Since	here	we	are	only	interested	in	
thought,	and	specifically	in	perceptual	demonstrative	thought,	we	will	focus	on	perceptual	attention.	How	this	notion	
of	attention	relates	to	the	linguistic	notion	of	attention	we	discuss	in	prior	work,	and	whether	there	is	an	analogue	of	
linguistic	attention	that	determines	the	interpretation	of	demonstratives	at	the	level	of	thought	in	mental	counterparts	
of	discourses	(such	as	“John	came	in.	He	sat	down”,	where	the	demonstrative	pronoun	is	resolved	to	the	individual	
made	prominent	by	the	prior	discourse)	is	a	complex	issue	we	cannot	address	here.	We	note	that	we	should	allow	for	
the	possibility	that	a	given	use	of	a	linguistic	demonstrative	can	fail	to	pick	out	an	object	the	speaker	is	simultaneously	
successfully	picking	out	with	a	token	of	a	mental	demonstrative.	Even	if	Fido	is	the	center	of	one’s	visual	attention	and	
is	successfully	picked	out	with	a	token	‘HE’	in	mental	representation	‘HE	SAT	DOWN,’	if	the	thinker	says	“John	came	
in.	He	sat	down”,	this	use	of	the	linguistic	expression	“he”	will	pick	out	John,	regardless.	It	is	also	worth	pointing	out	
that,	though	we	focus	on	perceptual	demonstratives	and	so	perceptual	attention,	we	see	no	in	principle	obstacles	to	
extending	our	account	to	demonstrative	thought	involving		other	perceptual	modalities,	or	non-perceptual	cases	(e.g.,	
using	‘THAT’	to	select	something	accessible	through	memory).	We	suggest	the	extension	would	exploit	analogous	of	
visual	attention	in	these	modalities,	but	we	refrain	from	attempts	to	extend	our	account	to	such	cases	in	the	present	
paper.		
29	One	might	object,	Why	think	there	is	a	current	center	of	attention?	Aren’t	we	typically	attending	to	more	than	one	
thing?	But	on	this	account,	mustn’t	we	posit	reference	failure	whenever	we	attend	to	more	than	one	thing?	Our	
 	
11	
6.	THAT	IS	DISTINCT	FROM	THAT.	
Then,	 these	 two	occurrences	of	 the	same	perceptual	demonstrative	 ‘THAT’	 can	refer	 to	a	and	b	
respectively	 only	 if	 there	 is	 a	 change	 in	 focal	 attention	 between	 the	 two;	 namely,	 the	 first	
occurrence	goes	in	tandem	with	promoting	a	to	the	center	of	focal	attention,	and	then,	the	second	
follows	a	shift	in	attention	which	promotes	b	to	the	center	of	focal	attention.	This	is	our	proposal	
in	a	nutshell.	Before	we	can	spell	out	its	details,	and	explain	how	it	tackles	the	Two	Tubes	case,	we	
first	survey	some	empirical	data	on	perceptual	attention.30	
	
Early	Vision,	Perceptual	Attention	and	Object	Tracking		
There	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 think	 early	 stages	 of	 visual	 processing	 begin	 with	 some	 kind	 of	
mechanism	of	pre-conceptual	object	selection—a	mechanism	of	non-conceptual	reference—that	
links	mind	and	world	through	a	causal,	as	opposed	to	informational	or	semantic,	relation	(Pylyshyn,	
2009,	1989;	Pylyshyn	and	Storm,	1988).	We	briefly	mention	some	evidence	for	this	hypothesis.		
Consider	 the	Multiple	Object	 Tracking	 (MOT)	 Experiment,	 as	 described	by	 Pylyshyn	 and	 Storm	
(1988).	In	the	basic	experiment	(represented	in	Figure	1,	borrowed	from	Scholl	(2009)),	subjects	
are	shown	8	to	12	identical	objects	on	a	display.	Some	are	then	briefly	made	salient,	and	indicated	
as	 targets	 (e.g.	 by	 blinking,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 Figure	 1(a)).	 All	 the	 objects	 then	 start	moving	
unpredictably	around	the	display	(Figure	1(b)).	After	approximately	10	seconds	the	motion	stops,	
and	the	subject	must	identify	the	initial	targets	(by	highlighting	them	with	a	cursor,	as	in	Figure	
1(c)).		
	
Figure	1.	
Experiments	 show	 humans	 can	 track	 up	 to	 five	 targets	 within	 the	 display	 with	 10	 identical	
independently	 moving	 objects;	 once	 this	 number	 is	 exceeded,	 performance	 significantly	
deteriorates.	 Importantly,	 as	 Pylyshyn	 argued	 at	 length	 (2009,	 1999,	 1989)	 the	 experiments	
suggest	 that	 the	early	vision	system	must	be	able	to	 individuate	and	keep	track	of	 these	visual	
objects	without	using	an	encoding	of	any	of	their	visual	properties.	Note	that	if	this	tracking	were	
appealing	to	some	descriptive	information,	it	would	have	to	be	sustainable	under	a	description	of	
the	objects’	location	at	a	time	alone,	since	they	are	otherwise	identical.	But,	since	the	objects	are	
                                                
account	will	indeed	have	to	be	made	consistent	with	the	possibility	of	multi-focal	attention.	We	will	gesture	towards	
a	solution	that	respects	this	below.	
30	A	related	account	to	ours	is	Levine	(2010),	who	likewise	focuses	on	the	role	of	attention.	However,	there	are	
important	differences	between	the	two,	which	will	be	relevant	for	giving	a	unique	unambiguous	representation	of	a	
demonstrative	on	each	of	its	occurrences.	We	will	elaborate	below.	
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in	 constant	 unpredictable	 motion,	 their	 locations	 are	 constantly	 changing;	 to	 track	 them	 by	
keeping	track	of,	and	updating,	their	respective	locations,	one	would	have	to	have	a	way	of	storing	
and	updating	their	respective	locations.		As	Pylyshyn	(2009;	1989)	and	Pylyshyn	and	Storm	(1988)	
argue,	it	is	implausible	that	this	strategy	is	employed,	since,	even	under	liberal	assumptions	about	
the	speed	of	attentional	shifts	that	would	have	to	be	involved,	we	would	not	be	able	to	account	
for	the	observed	performance	(subjects	perform	with	over	85%	accuracy,	and	the	proposed	model	
would	predict	the	best	performance	would	be	around	30%).	This	suggests	that	tracking	is	achieved	
without	recourse	to	descriptive	or	conceptual	information	of	the	targets.31		
Pylyshyn’s	conclusion	is	further	supported	by	the	fact	that	performance	does	not	drop	off	with	an	
increase	in	the	number	of	targets	up	to	5,	but	does	significantly	with	more	than	5	targets.	Pre-
conceptual	processing	 typically	 shows	 this	kind	of	a	pattern	of	uniform	performance	up	 to	 the	
limits	of	the	system’s	capacities,	followed	by	a	sudden	drop-off;	conceptual	processes,	by	contrast,	
exhibit	a	gradual	decrease	in	performance	with	a	corresponding	increase	in	complexity	and	the	
number	of	tasks	(e.g.,	tracking	a	single	target,	as	opposed	to	tracking	two,	three,	etc.).32	
To	explain	 this	 sort	of	 tracking	without	 recourse	 to	properties	of	 the	 targets	 tracked,	Pylyshyn	
(1989;	2003;	2009)	 suggests	 the	 visual	 system	contains	 a	mechanism	of	non-conceptual	 ‘visual	
indexing’,	which	enables	the	system	to	reference	and	track	multiple	distinct	targets	through	time.	
The	human	early	visual	system	is	equipped	with	(up	to	five	simultaneously	active)	visual	indices	
(FINSTs)	 that	 are	 activated,	 or	 ‘grabbed’	 by	 salient	 targets	 in	 the	 environment	 (e.g.,	 targets	
rendered	salient	by	‘flashing’	in	MOT).33,34	FINSTs	provide	symbols	connected	to	the	world	through	
a	 causal,	 not	 semantic,	 mechanism.	 Only	 after	 targets	 have	 grabbed	 FINSTs	 can	 the	 system	
cognitively	access	them,	and	direct	focal	or	selective	attention	towards	them.		
Pylyshyn	(2009)	cites	an	abundance	of	evidence	that	the	primary	unit	of	selection	by	FINSTs	(or	a	
unit	 of	 ‘FINSTing’)	 is	 objecthood,	 as	 opposed	 to	 regions	 of	 space.	 This	 means	 that	 what	 gets	
selected	by	FINSTs	is	roughly	co-extensional	with	physical	objects	in	our	world;	crucially,	however,	
the	 correlation	 need	 not	 be	 perfect,	 precisely	 because	 FINSTing	 is	 not	 achieved	 through	 an	
application	of	a	conceptual	category	(say,	‘OBJECTHOOD’),	but	rather	through	a	purely	causal	relation.	
Consequently,	although	what’s	selected	by	FINSTs	tends	to	correspond	to	physical	objects	in	our	
kind	of	world,	FINSTs	do	not	select	these	objects	qua	physical	objects,	and	can	thus	sometimes	fail	
to	 grab	 individual	 objects.	 One	 way	 to	 think	 about	 it	 is	 this:	 suppose	 we	 think	 of	 conceptual	
information	associated	with	an	object	as	contained	in	an	object	file	associated	with	that	object	(cf.	
                                                
31	It’s	striking	that	subjects	can	successfully	track	targets	even	when	all	their	qualitative	properties	have	been	changed,	
or	when	the	moving	target	disappears	and	reappears	as	if	going	behind	an	occluding	surface	(but	not	if	the	motion	is	
discontinuous).	(See	Pylyshyn	2009.)	
32	The	literature	on	the	subject	is	vast,	and	our	survey	is	cursory.	However,	many	studies	seem	to	corroborate	these	
conclusions.	 See	 Scholl	 et	 al	 (2001),	 Sears	 and	 Pylyshyn	 (2000),	 and	 Pylyshyn	 (2009)	 for	 discussion	 and	 a	 more	
comprehensive	list	of	references.	See	Scholl	(2009)	for	a	critical	discussion.	
33	An	anonymous	referee	points	out	that	it	might	be	confusing	to	talk	about	“targets”	(which	evoke	something	passive)	
doing	the	“grabbing”	(which	evokes	an	action),	so	we	take	a	moment	to	clarify	that	the	“targets”	are	targets	in	the	
context	of	the	task:	they	are	made	into	targets	for	the	purposes	of	the	task	by	‘flashing’	which	renders	them	salient;	
as	a	consequence	of	this	‘flashing’	the	FINSTs	are	“grabbed”	or	activated.		
34	Pylyshyn	(2009)	argues	the	targets	that	activate	FINSTs	tend	to	correspond	to	physical	objects	in	our	world.	However,	
since	this	mechanism	is	non-conceptual,	the	targets	are	not	selected	qua	physical	objects,	and	can,	thus,	at	times	fail	
to	correspond	to	real	physical	objects.	Pylyshyn	thus	calls	them	‘visual	objects’.	We	return	to	this	point	below.	
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Kahneman	et	al,	1992).	Then,	one	can	think	of	FINSTs	as	mechanisms	through	which	an	object	file	
is	associated	with	the	object	it	is	about	to	begin	wiht,	if	any	(where	crucially	that	association	does	
not	appeal	to	any	conceptual	information	contained	in	the	object	file—not	even	that	it	falls	under	
the	concept	‘OBJECTHOOD’).35		
If	 these	 findings	 are	 on	 the	 right	 track,	 the	 first	 stage	 in	 vision	 begins	 with	 a	 non-conceptual	
connection	between	mind	and	world—the	FINST	mechanism.	Only	once	such	a	non-conceptual	
connection	is	established	does	the	cognitive	system	gain	access	to	FINSTed	objects,	and	can	direct	
focal	 attention	 to	 them. 36 	But	 how	 does	 this	 help	 establish	 the	 referents	 of	 perceptual	
demonstratives?		
	
Attention	and	Perceptual	Demonstratives		
In	our	earlier	sketch,	we	proposed	that	the	referent	of	a	demonstrative	expression	is	that	object	
(if	any)	currently	at	the	center	of	attention.	If	the	model	sketched	in	the	last	section	is	on	the	right	
track,	 the	 most	 primitive	 mind-world	 connection	 is	 established	 through	 a	 pre-conceptual	
mechanism	of	FINSTing,	whereby	targets	that	grab	FINSTs	become	accessible	to	higher	cognitive	
processes,	and	become	potential	targets	of	focal,	or	selective,	attention.	For	a	candidate	object	a	
to	be	the	referent	of	a	perceptual	demonstrative,	a	must	first	become	a	target	that	activates,	i.e.	
g,	grabs,	one	of	the	FINSTs	and	second,	selective,	focal	attention	has	to	be	directed	to	this	FINSTed	
target.	Why	do	we	need	both	requirements?		
The	first	should	be	easy	to	understand.	The	FINSTing	mechanism,	on	this	model,	provides	the	most	
primitive,	non-conceptual	form	of	mind-world	connection	that	allows	for	concept	application—or,	
put	another	way,	it	is	the	mechanism	through	which	an	object	file	is	connected	with	the	object	it	
is	about	(if	any).	If	a	system	has	no	access	to	the	object,	that	object	cannot	be	a	part	of	the	content	
of	conceptual	thought;	since	this	access	is	achieved	(at	least	for	visual	objects	within	the	perceptual	
circle)	 through	 a	 mechanism	 of	 non-	 (or	 better,	 pre-)	 conceptual	 contact,	 a	 pre-conceptual	
connection	is	needed	for	concept	application.		
The	 second	 requirement	 is	 more	 complicated.	 Why	 do	 we	 need	 selective,	 focal	 attention	 in	
addition	to	a	primitive	non-conceptual	connection	to	fix	the	referent	of	a	demonstrative?	Why	isn’t	
a	non-conceptual	connection	sufficient?	In	its	favor,	there	would	be	nothing	more	to	applying	a	
perceptual	demonstrative	than	FINSTing	the	object.	But	this	suggestion	isn’t	going	to	fly	because	
FINSTs	 are	 pre-conceptual	 (non-conceptual),	 whereas	 thought	 involving	 a	 perceptual	
demonstrative	is	conceptualized,	involving	the	application	of	a	perceptual	demonstrative	concept,	
say,	 'THAT’.	 Although	 the	 demonstrative	 ‘THAT’	 may	 have	 limited	 or	 impoverished	 descriptive	
content,	 still	 thoughts	 involving	 this	 concept	 are	 nonetheless	 fully	 conceptualized.	 To	 see	 this,	
focus	 on	 other	 (perceptual)	 demonstratives	 (e.g.	 ‘HE’,	 ‘SHE’,	 etc.),	 which	 manifest	 the	 same	
dependence	upon	a	 (perceptually	available)	 situation	as	 the	demonstrative	 ‘THAT’,	 and	seem	to	
function	in	analogous	ways,	yet	carry	a	richer	descriptive	content	(associated	with	gender,	number	
                                                
35	For	this	characterization,	and	further	critical	discussion,	see	in	particular	Pylyshyn	(2009).		
36	For	further	discussion	of	the	relation	between	FINSTs,	perception,	attention,	and	reference,	see	also	Fodor	and	
Pylyshyn	(2015).		
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and	 person	 constraints).	 Clearly,	 thinking	 of	 an	 object	 under	 the	 concept	 ‘HE’	 makes	 use	 of	
properties	associated	with	that	object,	in	sharp	contrast	with	the	passive	mechanism	of	FINSTing.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 even	 after	 distinguishing	 perceptual	 demonstratives	 from	 non-conceptual	
mental	 symbols	 (FINSTs),	 we	 might	 still	 think	 a	 causal,	 non-conceptual	 connection	 achieved	
through	FINSTing	suffices	to	establish	the	referent	of	a	perceptual	demonstrative.		But,	then,	why	
not	just	say	the	referent	of	a	demonstrative	is	that	object	that	occupies	an	appropriate	position	in	
the	causal	chain	resulting	in	tokening	the	demonstrative?	The	problem	here	is	the	same	one	we	
began	with:	recall	the	Two	Tubes	case—where	the	referents	of	both	tokens	of	a	demonstrative	(by	
stipulation)	are	one	and	the	same;	if	we	assume	the	demonstrative	has	a	uniform	representation	
on	each	tokening	(i.e.	that	there	is	a	unique,	unambiguous	demonstrative	expression	the	tokens	
of	which	are	featured	in	the	relevant	representation),	then	we	are	back	to	square	one	with	respect	
to	the	problem	with	which	we	began.	The	relevant	thought	content	is	that	a	is	identical	to	a,	where	
a	has	been	referenced	via	the	same	vehicle	of	thought	twice.		Yet	the	thought	is	non-trivial	and	
informative.		
To	avoid	this	result,	we	need	a	more	complex	structure,	and	one	is	available.	We	have	said	before	
there	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 think	 FINSTs	 target	 what	 in	 our	 world	 corresponds	 to	 objects.	 What	
happens	 in	the	Two	Tubes	case,	or	the	Enterprise	example,	however,	 is	that	one	and	the	same	
object	grabs,	or	activates,	distinct	FINST	indices,	thus,	leading	to	establishing	distinct	object	files;	
distinct	non-conceptual	mental	symbols	are	associated	through	FINSTing	with	one	and	the	same	
object	(the	red	dot,	or	the	Enterprise).	In	other	words,	the	system	treats	one	object	as	if	it	were	
two.		
How	does	this	help	with	puzzles	surrounding	the	referents	of	demonstratives?	In	our	problematic	
case,	we	have	two	(non-conceptual)	mental	symbols	(causally,	non-conceptually)	targeting	a	single	
physical	object.	We	can	make	use	of	these	mental	symbols	in	accounting	for	problematic	cases	of	
the	 referents	 of	 demonstratives	 like	 the	 Two	 Tubes	 example.	What	 accounts	 for	 the	 cognitive	
significance	of	a	thought	involving	perceptual	demonstratives	is	that	the	referent	at	one	end	of	the	
causal	chain	results	in	the	relevant	tokening	of	a	perceptual	demonstrative,	together	with	the	non-
conceptual	mental	symbol—or	the	FINST	index—via	which	this	reference	is	established.	Now,	since	
at	 any	 time,	 the	 system	can	have	multiple	active	 indices	 (and	 in	our	example,	multiple	 indices	
connected	to	one	and	the	same	object),	what	makes	one	rather	than	another	the	index	through	
which	the	reference	of	a	token	of	a	demonstrative	is	established?	This	returns	us	to	our	second	
requirement.	The	answer	is	that	the	index	through	which	reference	is	fixed	is	the	one	which	guides	
the	allocation	of	selective,	focal	attention	at	the	occasion	of	tokening.	The	idea	is	that	selective,	
focal	attention	plays	the	role	of	mental	demonstration,		which	fixes	the	reference	of	the	tokened	
perceptual	demonstrative	(concept).	It	focuses	on	the	target,	and	the	demonstrative	references	
whatever	is	at	the	center	of	attention	at	the	time	of	tokening.	
Suppose	the	expression	‘@(	)’	represents	an	operator	that	updates	the	center	of	focal	attention,	
where	@(	)	directs	focal	attention	to	the	item	indexed	by	the	index	it	operates	on,	and	‘f1’...‘fn’,	as	
designating	the	FINST	indices	1	to	n,	respectively.	‘@(	)’	is	thus	a	mental	counterpart	of	a	pointing	
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gesture—a	 way	 of	 shifting,	 or	 re-focusing	 attention. 37 	Then,	 where	 ‘THAT’	 is	 a	 perceptual	
demonstrative	 concept	 (itself	 directly	 referential),	 the	 representation	 for	 the	 potentially	
informative	thought	in	the	Two	Tubes	example	is	(7)	below,	which	differs	from	the	uninformative	
and	trivial	(8)–(9):				
					
7. 	@(f1)	THAT	is	@(f2)	THAT.	
8. 	@(f1)	THAT	is	THAT.		
9. @(f2)	THAT	is	THAT.		
In	 (7),	 the	center	of	selective,	 focal	attention	shifts	between	two	tokenings	of	a	demonstrative	
from	one	 index	to	another.	So,	the	two	demonstratives	are	not	guaranteed	to	co-refer.	On	the	
other	hand,	in	(8)	and	(9),	the	attentional	focus	remains	unchanged,	and	hence,	different	tokens	
of	 a	 demonstrative	 are	 forced	 to	 co-refer. 38 	The	 reference	 of	 a	 perceptual	 demonstrative	 is	
whatever	is	at	the	center	of	the	selective,	focal	attention	(if	any	unique	thing	is)	at	the	time	of	the	
tokening.	In	(7)—(9),	the	subject	is	referring,	by	hypothesis,	to	a	single	physical	object;	however,	it	
can	still	be	informative	that	the	object	the	subject	is	attending	to	as	one	visual	object,	and	a	target	
of	one	visual	index,	is	the	same	object	as	the	one	the	subject	is	attending	to	as	a	distinct	visual	
object,	 targeted	by	a	distinct	 index.	This	 is	what	 it	means	to	have	an	object	be	a	target	of	 two	
distinct	FINST	indices—the	system	treats	the	object	as	two	distinct	visual	objects.	This	explains	why	
(7),	but	not	(8)	or	(9),	can	be	informative.		
We	account	for	the	thought	in	(3),	where	the	occurrences	of	its	demonstratives	respectively	refer	
to	 distinct	 objects—a	 and	 b—in	 a	 similar	 fashion.	 Suppose	 f1	 and	 f2	 are	 activated	 by	 a	 and	 b	
respectively.	We	capture	the	thought	in	(3)	as	(10):		
10. 		@(f1)	THAT	is	@(f2)	THAT.	
Both	occurrences	of	the	demonstrative	refer	to	what’s	currently	at	the	center	of	(focal)	attention.	
The	reference	of	the	first	occurrence	is	established	via	the	FINST	index	f1,	which	is	a	grabbed	by	a,	
                                                
37	For	an	account	of	pointing	gestures	as	linguistic	mechanisms	providing	attention-shifting	updates,	see	Stojnić	et	al	
(2017),	and	the	formal	implementation	therein.	As	mentioned	before,	the	account	in	Stojnić	et	al	(2017)	is	designed	
to	 model	 a	 linguistic	 notion	 of	 center	 of	 attention	 in	 discourse,	 which	 is	 maintained	 through	 a	 set	 of	 linguistic	
mechanisms	(pointing	gestures	including).	On	that	account,	something	can	be	at	the	center	of	attention,	in	that	sense,	
even	if	it	is	not	psychologically	most	salient,	or	a	focus	of	(joint)	attention	of	the	conversational	agents	(e.g.,	even	if	
Betty,	the	cat	is	perceptually	most	salient	and	the	focus	of	the	conversational	agents’	perceptual	attention,	if	someone	
says	“Mary	came	in.	She	sat	down,”		the	referent	of	‘she’	will	be	Mary	nevertheless,	because	this	referent	is	at	the	
center	of	(linguistic)	attention.			
38	Earlier,	 we	 questioned	whether	 different	 tokenings	 of	 a	 demonstrative	 expression	 can	 be	 guided	 by	 the	 same	
demonstration	or	intention.	On	our	account	of	demonstrative	concepts,	this	question	can	be	rephrased	by	whether	
one	can	have	constancy	of	focal	attention	between	different	tokenings	of	a	demonstrative	concept.	Insofar	as	one	can,	
the	corresponding,	uninformative	thought	(as	in	(8)	and	(9))	can	ensue.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	is	a	separate	
question	 from	 whether	 each	 token	 of	 the	 demonstrative	 expression	 in	 English	 requires	 a	 new	
demonstration/intention.	Either	answer	to	the	former	question	is	compatible	with	the	possibility	that	each	token	of	a	
demonstrative	 expression	 “that”	 in	 English	 might	 require	 a	 distinct	 demonstration	 (so	 that	 we	 don’t	 get	 the	
corresponding	uninformative	representations	for	tokens	of	the	English	sentence	“That	is	that”).	
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and	the	reference	of	the	second	occurrence	of	the	demonstrative	is	established	via	the	FINST	index	
f2,	activated	by	b.
39		
We	 suggested	 that	 selective,	 focal	 attention	 could	 play	 the	 role	 of	 an	 accompanying	 (mental)	
demonstration,	which	 in	 tandem	with	 the	demonstrative	 fixes	 the	reference	of	a	 tokening	of	a	
perceptual	 demonstrative.	 But	 can	 attention	 suffice	 to	 supplement	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	
demonstrative	 in	 fixing	 reference?	 One	 reason	 to	 think	 not	 is	 discussed	 by	 Levine	 (2010).	 He	
develops	an	account	which,	like	ours,	maintains	that	the	selection	of	a	target	and	attention,	via	
FINSTing,	 are	 both	 necessary	 for	 establishing	 reference.	 However,	 he	 claims	we	 need	 another	
operation,	namely,	the	operation	of	mental	demonstration,	to	fix	reference,	over	and	above	what	
is	delivered	by	attention.	His	reasoning	is	that	subjects	can	simultaneously	attend	to	more	than	
one	thing.	Since	demonstratives	require	uniqueness,	 if	 it	were	solely	the	selection	of	the	target	
and	attention	that	mattered	for	reference	fixing,	we	would	get	a	reference	failure	whenever	the	
subject	is	attending	to	more	than	one	thing.		
There	is	good	evidence	that	one	can	indeed	attend	to	more	than	one	thing	at	a	time;	one	may	think	
the	Multiple	 Object	 Tracking	 experiment	 described	 above	 provides	 evidence	 for	 precisely	 this	
possibility.40 	We,	 in	 no	 way,	 intend	 to	 deny	 this.	 We	 are	 merely	 suggesting	 that	 the	 process	
relevant	 for	 reference	 fixing	a	perceptual	 (singular)	demonstrative	 requires	 selective,(uni-)focal	
attention,	which	 can	be	 targeted	 to	each	of	 the	 indexed	 targets,	 separately.41		 	 This	 is	 entirely	
consistent	with	 thinking	 that	 systems	 like	ours	 can	 (and	 typically)	do	attend	 to	more	 than	one	
target	at	a	time.	So,	the	possibility	of	multi-focal	attention	is	in	no	way	incompatible	with	the	claim	
that	 focal	 attention	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 establishing	 the	 reference	 of	 a	 demonstrative.	 It	 is	
sufficient	that	the	subject	can	direct	focal	attention	towards	particular	indexed	targets,	as	seems	
to	be	 so	 (Pylyshyn,	 2009),	 for	 it	 to	be	possible	 to	 safeguard	 against	 reference	 failure	due	 to	 a	
violation	 of	 uniqueness. 42 	It	 can	 still	 be	 that	 selective,	 (uni-)focal	 attention	 is	 required	 for	
demonstrative	thought,	even	if	creatures	like	us	can	and	do	typically	attend	to	more	than	one	thing	
at	a	time.	Since	the	relation	of	mental	demonstration	is	posited	to	amend	the	alleged	insufficiency	
of	attention,	it	seems	like	no	such	relation	need	be	posited.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 more	 important	 distinction	 separates	 our	 view	 from	 Levine	 (2010).	 In	
postulating	mental	demonstrations,	which	serve	as	pointers	to	FINST,	Levine	seems	to	take	them	
as	 mental	 demonstratives,	 or	 parts	 thereof.	 He	 writes:	 “The	 demonstrative	 constituents	 in	
                                                
39	One	might	worry	that	since	our	explanation	relies	on	shift	in	focal	attention	to	capture	cognitive	significance,	that	
in	terms	of	what	is	going	the	shift	appears	to	be	a	brute	fact,	that	cannot	be	explained	at	the	personal	level	by	the	
difference	in	FINSTs	at	the	subpersonal	level.	But	even	though	FINSTs	are	subpersonal	pointers,	they	provide	input	to	
cognitive	processing	at	the	persona	level—e.g.,	storing	information	about	FINSTed	objects	in	respective	object	files,	
or	directing	attention	to	relevant	visual	objects	that	facilitates	such	processing.	The	cognitive	significance	associated	
with	attention	shifting	operators	we	posit	in	relevant	mental	representations	that	track	distinctions	at	subpersonal	
level	should	not	worry	us	more	than	the	distinctions	in	conceptual	content	stored	in	respective	object	files	that	track	
connections	to	different	FINSTs.	We	thank	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	raising	this	issue.		
40	Multiple	object	tracking	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘tracking	using	multifocal	attention’.	
41	Perhaps,	multi-focal	attention	is	relevant	for	reference	fixing	for	plural	demonstratives.	We	cannot	pursue	this	topic	
here.	
42	And	indeed,	it	seems	to	us	plausible	that	in	the	split-attention	case,	without	serial	allocation	of	focal	attention	to	
distinct	visual	indices,	one	should	expect	reference	failure	for	“THAT	IS	THAT,”	just	as	one	would	were	one	to	say	
“That		is	a	cute	dog”	looking	at	park	full	of	dogs,	none	particularly	salient.	
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thoughts	can	thus	be	thought	of	as	simply	pointers	to	previously	selected	objects”	(Levine,	2010,	
179).	 A	 demonstrative	 constituent	 of	 thought	 corresponds	 to	 mental	 demonstrations	 to	
corresponding	percepts.	 So,	 according	 to	him,	 the	demonstrative	 is	 canonically	 represented	as	
‘[!]’,	which	 is	 a	 directly	 referential	 singular	 term	 referring	 to	 the	object	 represented	by	 the	
percept	designated	by	‘!’.	But,	this,	from	our	standpoint,	re-creates	the	ambiguity	we	were	trying	
to	avoid:	different	tokens	of	a	demonstrative	concept	need	to	be	represented	in	non-uniform	ways	
(corresponding	to	different	percept-denoting	symbols).	On	our	account,	by	contrast,	ambiguity	is	
averted—the	 demonstrative	 concept	 always	 receives	 uniform,	 unambiguous	 interpretation.		
Ambiguity	is	averted	because	we	separate,	as	seems	to	us	correct	to	separate,	the	representation	
corresponding	 to	 a	 token	 of	 the	 demonstrative	 concept	 itself,	 from	 the	 attention-affecting	
operation	that	determines	the	reference	of	each	token	demonstrative.		
	
Conclusion	
We	have	sketched	and	partially	defended	an	account	of	demonstratives	 in	LOT	that	we	believe	
captures	 our	 intuitions,	 while	 preserving	 direct	 referentiality	 and	 allowing	 for	 a	 uniform	
representation	of	the	tokens	of	demonstrative	concepts,	thus,	avoiding	an	unwelcome	ambiguity.	
A	demonstrative	refers	to	whatever	is	at	the	center	of	selective,	focal	attention	at	the	time	of	its	
tokening,	where	attention	operates	on	non-conceptual	representations—FINST	indices.	Thoughts	
with	distinct	co-referential	occurrences	of	a	demonstrative	concept	can	be	informative,	so	long	as	
there	 is	an	appropriate	shift	 in	 selective	 focal	attention	between	 them,	which	helps	determine	
reference	in	tandem	with	each	tokening	of	the	demonstrative,	by	focussing	on	the	relevant	FINST	
indices	 in	 turn.	 This	 account	 is	 straightforward,	 and	 it	 is	 one,	we’d	 like	 to	 think,	 Fodor	would	
embrace.	
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